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I. Introduction
The legal interpretation of security interests remains an
important judicial activity in the United Kingdom, as recently
manifested in the Re Spectrum Plus Ltd. decision in the House of
Lords.1 Lawyers across the Atlantic, in the United States, and in
most of in Canada would probably view this active role of the
judiciary as unusual and have codified the law relating to security
interests defining them in a functional way. Litigation has largely
decreased under the conceptually clear personal property security
system instituted by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) in the United States.2 Such clarity is desired in the United
Kingdom and some hope that decisions like that in Spectrum could
prevent costly litigation.
t Lecturer in Law, University of Leicester, United Kingdom. I would like to thank
Will Shen for reading an earlier draft of this article and providing valuable comments.
I See In re Spectrum Plus Ltd., [2005] UKIHL 41, (2005) 3 W.L.R. 58 (stating that
a fixed charge may validly be taken over book debts).
2 See David E Allan, PersonalProperty Security-Rip Van Winkle Awakes in the
Antipodes, 13 J. INT'L BANKING L. 1 (1997) (praising the various merits of the American
personal property security codification in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code).
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The Spectrum decision was much anticipated for its potential
to clarify when and how fixed charges may be taken over by
accounts receivables, also known as book debts. However, this is
only one instance of judicial interpretation defining the parameters
of what may be permissible in commercial lending activity. Many
issues in the interpretation of security interests remain open. One
such question is whether a charge over present revolving assets,
but not future revolving assets, would bring the charge within a
fixed and not a floating charge even if the present revolving assets
are now specifically appropriated to the charge.3
In this paper, I will explain why the English law is to this
date beset with issues concerning the interpretation of security
interests, and suggest that the United Kingdom has been hesitant
to fabricate security interests in the law. That is, as compared with
more resolute approaches taken in the United States, Canada, and
now New Zealand, in reforming the law on personal property
security interests.
According to an interdisciplinary study law and anthropology,
the legal system "fabricates" things in relation to persons 4 which
means that the relationship between persons and things is
described in accordance with the legal language of rights in a
given legal framework. This paper discusses the legal fabrication
of security interests in the United Kingdom, or rather, the lack of
fabrication, with particular attention to fixed and floating charges.
This paper argues that in the United Kingdom, historical reasons
gave rise to a delay in confronting the need to provide the legal
interpretation of security interests. Until the policy of preferential
creditors was given legislative force, there was no apparent need
to fabricate security interests in the law. The policy resulted in a
need to clearly define the terms fixed and floating charges as they
led to different priorities among charge holders. The fixed charge
3 The concepts of "fixed" and "floating" charges are unique to the United
Kingdom and several commonwealth jurisdictions where English law has been
transposed. More will be discussed in Parts II and I1. See Re Atlantic Computer
Systems Plc., [1992] Ch. 505 (C.A.) (exemplifying the issue of a fixed charge over
present assets).
4 See Engin Deniz Akarli, Gedik: A Bundle of Rights and Obligationsfor Istanbul
Artisans and Traders, 1750-1840, in LAW, ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE SOCIAL MAKING OF PERSONS AND THINGS 166, 168-69 (Alain Pottage & Martha

Mundy eds., Cambridge University Press 2004).
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holder is prioritized above that of the preferential creditor,5 but the
floating charge holder ranks below the preferential creditor.
Hence, there is a need to fabricate security interests within the
legal framework so that priorities of insolvency are clear.
However, the need was not met by legislation, as legislators used
the terms "fixed charge" and "floating charge" but did not attempt
to define them. Legislation relies on the definition, of these terms
as commonly understood. This is demonstrated by the Companies
Act of 19006 through the Insolvency Act of 1986, which provided
for the priority of preferential creditors to be ranked between fixed
and floating charge holders with fixed charges to receive highest
priority.7
The preferential creditor policy continues in the
Enterprise Act of 2002, which amends parts of the Insolvency Act
of 1986.8 The Enterprise Act of 2002 has removed some creditors
from the preferential class. 9 The Companies Act of 1989 provides
for the registration of company charges so that they may not be
void against the liquidator, and the relevant provisions of the
Companies Act-which feature the use of the terms "fixed
charge"-or "floating charge" do not provide legislative
interpretation of those terms.' 0
The unclear definitions of fixed and floating charge burdened
the courts with the unenviable task of interpretation, which
produced much case law. Some judges took a pro-commerce
stance while some were mindful of the policy protecting
unsecured creditors. The result was complex and detailed case
law. There is still a general lack conceptual coherence of the
fabrication of fixed and floating charges.
This paper argues that law of security interests needs a more
coherent legal framework in three fundamental respects. First, the
law must define security interests. Second, the law must provide
the means of taking such interests and finally, the issue of
priorities at insolvency must be resolved. The policy position
5 Dept. of Enter., Trade, and Inv., http://www.detini.gov.uk/cgi-bin/downutildoc
?id= 151.

6 Companies Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 48, § 14 (Eng.).
7 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 59 (Eng.).
8 See Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, § 251.
9 Id.
10 See Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, § 395-99.
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favors preferential creditors trumping certain security holders, and
it is unfortunate that commercial lenders still try to side-step the
policy by taking advantage of the weak legal fabrication of
security interests. Commercial lenders attempt this side-step by
framing their security interests into a type that would trump
preferential creditors. The United Kingdom Law Commission"
has produced some recent recommendations on reforming the
registration of company charges, recognizing that there is a wider
need for comprehensive review of the law relating to security
interests in general.1 2 However, the Commission has refrained
from issuing recommendations that would significantly reform the
first two aspects mentioned above. 3
In Part II, a general discussion provides an explanation of how
U.K. law adopted a market-based approach to interpret fixed and
floating charges, and never truly elucidated cogent legal
fabrication. Part III discusses the effect of such a lack in
fabrication, resulting in judicial attempts to interpret security
interests, particularly fixed and floating charges by bundling
several concepts. These concepts relate to the definition of a
security interest, the means of taking of a security interest, and
priorities at insolvency. This paper argues that the bundling
approach is unsatisfactory compared to the "unbundled" approach
used in the United States, and adopted by Canada and New
Zealand. Part III argues that legal fabrication of fixed and floating
charges, if not of all security interests, should be undertaken by
first unbundling the three concepts of definition of security
interest, means of taking of security interest, and priorities, and
then any relationship between the three concepts can be clearly
defined. Part III.A will examine the United Kingdom's bundling
approach to interpretation and Part III.B will examine the
American approach of fabrication of security interests by
unbundling the concepts of definition, means of taking, and
priorities. Part III.B will reveal that the American approach has
more to it than meets the eye. Part IV discusses the prospects of
II Law Commission, Company Security Interests, 1 1.70, 3.175 (Cm 6654) (2005),
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/Ic296.pdf. The Law Commission is an independent
body whose task is to systematically study possibilities of law reform. It also issues
recommendations to the government to provide reform legislation.
12 See id.
13 Id.
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legal fabrication of security interests in the United Kingdom and
whether that may be provided for by legislation, case law, the
market, or academics.
II. The Genesis of the Interpretation of Security Interests
A prominent commentator remarked that English law has
always adapted well to commercial needs, demonstrating
flexibility and giving effect to reasonable practices in commerce. 4
This is also the case for the law of secured credit in its evolution
as primarily judge-made private law.
Another prominent
commentator pointed out that there are several qualities of such
judge-made private law that lie beneath the endurance and
popularity of the law. 5 These qualities are: the permissive
character of the law to allow the taking of the widest range of
assets as security, especially favorably disposed towards nonpossessory security, 6 the existence of simple means for creation of
such security interests, existence of rules for effective publicity to
third parties, and the relatively straightforward self-help
mechanisms for enforcement against such security upon default. 7
The development of the securities law in the United Kingdom
is a response to market needs. Therefore, the law of security
interests is market-based and affirms the constructs provided by
the market. First, the law is generously permissive concerning
what may be taken as security. The law's tolerance of expansion
in security, whether by deliberate engineering or not, fits well with
anthropological observations about the development of commerce.
Both John Locke's political economy theories celebrating
private property 18 and the growth of capitalism, which celebrates
14 See ROY GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 31 (Sweet &

Maxwell 1998).
15 Gerard McCormack, Personal Property Security Law Reform in England and

Canada,J. Bus. L., 2002, at 113, 116.
16 In this area, many civil law jurisdictions still struggle with the perception that
non-possessory security interests, may result in fraud upon creditors. Therefore this fear
still restricts the growth and expansion of security. See PHILIP WOOD, COMPARATIVE
LAW OF SECURITY AND GUARANTEES 4-6 (Sweet & Maxwell 1995).

17 See McCormack, supra note 15.
18 See generally, JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1960); see also CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN

SOCIETY (Robert B. Pippin ed,. 1979).

These works are all quoted and discussed
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ownership of property, have become resilient "cultural memes"' 19
that dominate the Western cultural views of property.2" The ability
to create various relationships in property would facilitate various
forms of commercial dealings.
Even before the industrial
revolution, medieval law observed a range of relationships
between people in relation to things.21
With increasing
industrialization, the output of things has increased dramatically
and the relationship between people and property has developed
with more sophistication. In particular, relationships between
people include more and more types of property 22 as well as
divisions of interests in this property.2 3 In addition to that,
increased commodifying of various items allows more and more
objects to be regarded as property where interests and divisions of
interests could arise.2 4

With the rise of the joint stock company, enterprise, and
critically and at length in Spyros M. Maniatis, Trade Mark Rights-A JustificationBased
on Property, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 123 (2002).
19 KATE DisTIN,THE SELFISH MEME 1-255 (2005) (developing the idea of the meme

as a "cultural gene"). In this book, Distin argues that cultural "genes," otherwise known
as memes, store cultural information specific to its times and environment, and develop
to survive in changing environments, resulting in a process of cultural evolution. Thus,
her theory suggests that culture evolves quite similar to biological evolution in the
Darwinian thesis. Id.
20 See generally C. M. HANN, Introduction: the Embeddedness of Property, in
PROPERTY RELATIONS: RENEWING THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION 1-47 (C.M. Hann

ed,. Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).
21 See Alan MacFarlane, The Mystery of Property: Inheritance and Industrialization
in Englandand Japan, in PROPERTY RELATIONS, supra note 20, at 104, 108.

22 In economic anthropology, it is thought that there are a few stages of
development with respect to the relationship between man and things. Capitalism, or the
explosion of assets that may be accumulated to make profit, is a recent stage. See
generally Stephen Gudeman, The Anthropology of Economy: Community, Market, and
Culture (2001). Gudeman divides the stages of economic anthropology into four
categories: (1) the base, where a community shares natural resources; (2) allotment,
where individuals start to apportion property rights and use them as gifts or exchange
within the family; (3) exchange, where such property rights may be given or exchanged
with external members of the community; and (4) capitalism, where property and
exchange exploded and could be carried out with anyone at large and in a depersonalized
manner. Id. at 7-8.
23 Marilyn Strathem, Division of Interests and Language of Ownership, in
PROPERTY RELATIONS, supra note 20, at 214 n. 15.
24 Susan Strasser, Introduction to Commodifying Everything, in COMMODIFYING
EVERYTHING: RELATIONSHIPS OF THE MARKET 3 (2003).
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increased commerce, the growing need for credit and consequent
need for putting up security 25 meant that expanded notions of
property were put into play. The notion of security expanded in
terms of the type of proprietary subject matter that could be used,
as well as myriad divisions of interest in subject matter. 26 JeanChristophe Agnew, a leading anthropologist, opines that the
development of commerce took place as "episodic acquisitions"
giving way to a "continual flow of value and service. ' ' 27 This is
similar to the development of credit in that credit is not seen as the
episodic need of an enterprise, but a continual occurrence on the
25 Without security, credit would be restricted and the general expansion of
enterprise and commerce would be hindered. The idea that expansion of credit and
expansions of security should occur simultaneously is well documented. Heywood W.
Fleisig, Economic Functions of Security in a Market Economy, in EMERGING FINANCIAL
MARKETS AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS 15 (Joseph J. Norton & Mads Andenas eds.,

1998); see also Guido Ferranini, Changes to PersonalPropertyLaw in Italy, in MAKING
COMMERCIAL LAW 477 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997) (discussing secured credit supported
by theories of transactional cost economics); GERARD MCCORMACK, SECURED CREDIT IN
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW 1-27 (2004); see David E. Allan, Personal Property
Security in Australia-A Long, Long Trail A-Winding, 106 DICK. L. REV. 145, 150-52
(2001); GOODE, supra note 14; Roy Goode, Security in Cross-BorderTransactions,33
TEX. INT'L L. J. 47, 47 (1998); Heywood W. Fleisig & Nuria de la Pefia, Peru: How
Problems in the Frameworkfor Secured TransactionsLimit Access to Credit, 3 NAFTA:
L. & Bus. REV. AM., 33, 33-40 (1997); Gerard McCormack, The Priority of Secured
Credit: An Anglo-American Perspective, J. Bus. L., 2003, at 389, 401-04 (listing
comprehensive reasons linking security law to more and better credit). But see Thomas
H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financingand PrioritiesAmong Creditors,
88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979) (doubting that security provision is necessary to provision of
credit as there are no efficiency arguments in support of the provision of security); Alan
Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 259-61 (1989); Alan
Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities:A Review of Current Theories,
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7-33 (1981); Alan Schwartz, Taking the Analysis of Security
Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2073, 2081-87 (1994); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle
of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1068-69 (1984). See generally Homer Kripke,
Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a
Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (1985) (attacking the theories that doubt
whether secured credit is necessary as being divorced from practical commercial reality);
James J. White, Efficiency Justificationsfor Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L.
REV. 473 (1984) (arguing that the efficiency models take into account lenders that are
not risk neutral, that security does have an impact upon decisions to lend, and a higher
rate of interest is not exactly compensation for lack of security).
26 Such as the development of the floating charge.
27 Jean-Christophe Agnew, The Give and Take of Consumer Culture, in
COMMODIFYING EVERYTHING 12 (quoting PAUL HAWKEN ET AL., NATURAL CAPITALISM:
CREATING THE NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (1999)).
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balance sheet of the life of the enterprise. Credit is a fact of life
necessitated by the chains of supply, delivery, and retail, as well as
the time lags between turnovers.28 The development of big-ticket
financing and the time lag between outlay of capital and returns
also necessitated a growth in credit.2 9 The growth of credit
triggered the increase in types and varieties of security instruments
used to secure such credit. Expansions in the definitions of
property enabled this notable enlargement in conceptions of
security instruments.3 °
The role English law played in the development of commerce
was a facilitative one. Private law provided the legal framework
for property notions in security.31 Additionally, judges largely
allowed creation of security interests over a wide array of subject
matter, including future property,3 2 and allowed the floating charge
to secure the continual undertaking of the business if the business
did not have more specific assets to charge.33 Thus, the law not
only allowed the taking of security over novel forms of assets but
also recognized novel interests in rem to most expediently
facilitate commerce. Even the now overruled cases of Siebe
Gorman34 and In Re New Bullas Trading Ltd.35 (as will be
28 Id.
29 Id.

30 See Goode, Security in Cross-BorderTransactions,supra note 25.

31 Much of early private commercial law was derived from commercial practices
generally accepted by merchants, although whether there was truly a body of lex
mercatoria is in some controversy. See generally CHARLES MITCHELL, HISTORY OF THE

LAW MERCHANT (1904) (detailing the rise of mercantile law, but holding the view that
such law is absorbed into national law rather than constituting a law of its own as the
nature of mercantile law in different jurisdictions remained disparate for quite some
time); Clive M. Schmitthoff, Nature and Evolution of the Transnational Law of
Commercial Transactions, in THE TRANSNATIONAL
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (Norbert Horn & Clive M. Schmittoff eds., 1982); FILIP DE
LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA 317-21 (1992) (arguing that

there is no such thing as a real lex mercatoria); see also Clive Schmittoff, International
Business Law: A New Law Merchant, 2 CURRENT L. & SOC. PROBS. 129, 131-35 (1961)
(making modem commentary on whether there is a lex mercatoria).
32 See Holroyd v. Marshall (1861-62) 11 Eng. Rep. 999 (H.L.) (holding that the
sale of future property transfers the beneficial interest in that property).
33 See generally Robert R. Pennington, The Genesis of the Floating Charge, 23
MOD. L. REV. 630, 634-38 (1960).
34 Siebe Gorman & Co. Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd., (1979) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 142
(Ch.D.).
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discussed in Part III) manifested a pro-commerce attitude in
allowing freely contracting parties to divide and delineate their
rights over subject matter in novel ways.
Second, judges did not fabricate security interests in their own
legal language, but rather adopted the commercial fabrications of
security interests. There was, in other words, very limited
refraining of the contractual security agreement between parties.
Even if sale and lease-back arrangements may be a form of
secured financing in substance, sales and lease-backs were treated
as transfer-of-title arrangements rather than security arrangements,
fully respecting parties' freedom of contract.36 In terms of English
commercial law, arguably, the law of security allowed the
fabrication of security interests largely in tandem with commercial
desires, and did not straitjacket such fabrication with legal
principles. This is unlike the approach of continental European
jurisdictions that judge the acceptability of security transactions
according to fundamental legal values such as the "false wealth"
principle.37 Therefore, in many continental jurisdictions, nonpossessory security is largely not allowed due to fear of fraud.38 In
sum, the legal fabrication of security interests in the United
Kingdom was limited as such fabrication responded to and relied
on commercial fabrication instead of leading. In the case of fixed
and floating charges, i.e., in the early case of In re Panama,New
Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Company39 where the floating
charge began, the court performed a more descriptive than
prescriptive function. Similarly, the Companies Act of 1900
provided that the non-registration of a floating charge was void

35 Re New Bullas Trading Ltd., (1994) 1 B.C.L.C. 485 (Civ.).
36 The famous Romalpa clause is also an instance of the judiciary accepting the
commercial fabrication of a transaction. ROY GOODE, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND
SECURITY 7 (2d ed. 1988).
37

See

PHILIP R. WOOD, COMPARATIVE LAW OF SECURITIES AND GUARANTEES

1-5
(1995).
38 Franco-Latin jurisdictions such as France continue to remain rather skeptical
about the acceptability of various forms of non-possessory security. See id. 1-7. In
Italy, adoption of the concept of chattel mortgages is also slow, and reliance is placed
more heavily on a lien system and systems where ownership structures are used such as
leasing and factoring. See Ferranini, supra note 25, 483-90.
39 See In re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Company (1870) 5
Ch. App. 318.
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against
liquidators but did not define what the floating charge
40
was.

In In re Panama,Lord Justice Sir Giffard interpreted a charge
over "all undertakings of a company" as effective against all of the
company's property at the point of default. This totally excluded
unsecured creditors from recovery. 41 in that case, the learned Lord
Justice did not fabricate the charge in any conceptual terms and
agreed with the security instrument that it was a charge over the
company's entire undertaking.42 Thus, the case focused on
affirming the validity of such a security instrument as parties had
intended, and no further effort was made to fabricate the security
interest within a legal framework.
In In re Yorkshire
4
3
Woolcombers, Lord Justice Williams asserts that in Government
44
Stocks and Other Securities Investment Co. v. Manila Ry. Co.,
Lord Macnaghten distinguished between a fixed and floating
charge. Lord Williams said that a fixed charge was taken over
subject matter that is specific and ascertainable or was in its nature
capable of immediate fastening on the asset, while the floating
charge had a hovering character and usually related to a class of
assets or present and future assets. 45 As will be argued in Part III,
however, this is an early form of conceptualization or fabrication
that unfortunately did not give rise to the development of clearer
legal fabrication. The lack in clear legal fabrication subsequently
resulted in the "bundling approach" taken in later case law with
regard to the legal interpretation of fixed and floating charges.
The ease with which judges developed the private law
framework for credit and security may perhaps be explained by a
dominant reliance on the doctrine of freedom of contract. 46 This
doctrine would allow the individual contracting parties to enforce
the terms of what they have bargained for without much external
40

Companies Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 48 (Eng.).

41

In re Panama, 5 Ch. App. at 321-23.

42 Id.

43 Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Ass'n Ltd., (1903) 2 Ch. 284, 291.
44 Govt. Stocks and Other Securities Inv. Co. v. Manila Ry. Co., (1987) A.C. 81

(H.L.).
45

See id.

46 PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 455-78

(1979).
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restraint.47
Thus, the approach of English private law to credit and
security was both minimal and formal. Arguably, judges took the
minimal approach manifested in the facilitative approach and
allowed assets that could provide a right in rem to be treated as
security. This minimal approach also allowed for a more formal
approach to security, allowing different commercially fabricated
instruments to be regarded as they were, without further legal
reconceptualization.48 This led to legal compartmentalization in
the law with regard to different financing arrangements. There
were hardly any unifying concepts with regard to security
interests.4 9
The freedom of contract between lender and borrower did not
seem to provide an optimal lending solution in the market.
Externalities arose in the process as individual secured lenders
became more protected than other unsecured creditors of the
borrower. Secured lenders could enforce against a particular
security and could effectively remove the security from the pool of
assets left in insolvency. It could be argued that the priority of
secured lenders subverted the final pari passu division of the
borrowers' assets upon insolvency.5 ° Furthermore, unsecured
lenders had no opportunity to intervene in the "freedom of
contract" to protect their rights.51 These are issues of redistributive
47 See id., at 226-37; GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).

The
notion of "freedom," is assumed to be individual, positive freedom. One critic examines
this notion of freedom in light of negative forms of freedom and net social increase in
freedom for others where individual freedoms are restricted. If more notions of
"freedom," particularly social freedom, were discussed, then the "freedom" of contract
may not be given an aura of greatness that is beyond its actual narrow confines. See
Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the "Rise and Fall," 79 B.U.L.
REV. 263, 352-54 (1999).
48 For example, retention of title clauses and hire purchase continue to be regarded
as issues of when ownership passes rather than that the seller has retained security in the
goods until payment is made in full.
49 See Gerard McCormack, Rewriting the English Law of Personal Property
Securities and Article 9 of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code, 24 Co. LAW. 69, 76
(2003).
50 Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy With Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full
PriorityDebates, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1373, 1388-93 (1997).
51 Unsecured creditors play no part in the compacts between borrowers and secured
creditors.
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justice or fairness. Professor Elizabeth Warren argues that the
taking of security and improvement of a creditor's position by
contract may be in the freedom of contract, but such freedom
impinges on the rights of other creditors, especially involuntary
unsecured creditors who rely on the final pari passu division of
the insolvent's assets.52 If full priority is granted to secured
creditors, the law on security takes away state regulated rights at
insolvency.53 Further, due to a lack of information, the affected
unsecured lenders would hardly know that loan negotiations were
taking place between the debtor and secured lenders, therefore
unsecured lenders would not likely be able to intervene to protect
their rights. Regulation is needed to correct this market failure.
Unsecured creditors in the United Kingdom also exerted
political pressure, which resulted in statutory inroads into the
freedom of contract between secured lenders and borrowers. The
high priority status of secured creditors was modified by
subordinating floating charge holder claims to preferential
creditors in the late nineteenth century.54 Such preferential
creditors were the Crown and the crew.
Therefore, policy
dictated that not all secured lenders had full priority at insolvency
and some creditors, although unsecured, would be able to rank
ahead of some secured lenders.56
However, after the policy came into force, the general
observation was that as companies failed they frequently
postponed their debts to the Crown and crew to such an extent that
upon liquidation, fixed charge holders and preferential creditors
generally took all that the company had left and floating charge
52

See Warren, supra note 50.

53

See id.

Companies Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 48, § 14(1) (Eng.); see also David
Capper, Fixed Charges over Book Debts-Back to Basics but How Far Back?,
L.M.C.L.Q., 2002, at 246, 248.
54

55 The Crown referred to the Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise and Office of
Social Security; the crew referred to employees.
56 The policy would therefore seem to be based on externality justifications that
create inroads into the freedom of private bargains. Externalities do not always justify
imposing limits on the contractual bargain privately struck. See MICHAEL J.

TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 58-77 (1993) (discussing the

externality analysis); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits
of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 550-68 (2003) (explaining the externality analysis
is also supported by efficiency arguments in contract theory).

2006]

LEGAL FABRICATION OF SECURITY INTERESTS

holders were left with a security that was not worth much.57
As floating charge holders suffered, the attractiveness of the
floating charge subsided. Lenders tried to frame their security
interests as fixed charges, even over assets or divisions of interests
in assets that might not have traditionally been subject to fixed
charges.5" Lenders took advantage of the fact that the framing" of
the preferential policy in the legal framework was rather
unfortunate. The policy was framed in terms of the language of
the market, namely that the policy identified fixed and floating
charge holders but made no attempt to define or redefine them,
and relied on the interpretations of the fixed or floating charge in
the market. It has already been argued that those interpretations in
law were not clear, and Lord Millett expressly acknowledged that
the early notion of the "floating charge" was a business term and
not a legal term of art. 60 Thus, the market took advantage of the
lack in clarity to push the interpretational parameters of the fixed
charge.
Consequently the judiciary had to wrestle with the
interpretive minutiae of what made a fixed charge in one case or
another. Judicial interpretation was influential in the litigation
relating to fixed charges over book debts (as will be discussed in
some detail in Part III). In this process, the judges only dealt with
cases at hand and were constrained by factual situations. As a
result, they have been unable to articulate a "big picture"
conceptualization of the law of security.
When the United Kingdom did not need legal fabrication of
security interests, the level of fabrication was consistently low.
The permissive climate allowed most assets to be taken as security
and most agreements were respected for the structure they took as
long as they were not offensive to public policy. There was no
real need to fabricate security interests with great precision.

57 Alex Wass, Security for Lending-Book Debts, 16 J. INT'L BANKING L. 47
(2001).
58 See infra Part III.A for discussion.
59 The framing of an issue is a highly important undertaking as it affects the
assumptions that may or may not be made regarding that issue, and provides the lenses
through which an issue could be viewed. See generally ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND
MARKET ECONOMY (2000) (arguing this semiotic understanding of law's role in a market
economy); ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTExT 26-55 (2004).

60 See Agnew & Another v. Comm'r of Inland Revenue Privy Council, [2001] 2
A.C. 710, 719.
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However, the policy of preferential creditors forced the clearer
delineation between fixed and floating charges, and prompted the
interpretation exercise. This resulted in the judicial bundling of
the three aspects of a security interest definition, the means of
taking of a security interest, and priority issues at insolvency.
III. Legal Fabrication of Fixed and Floating ChargesBundling and Unbundling
As discussed, lenders tried to construct their security interests
as fixed charges so that they would attain a superior position to
preferential creditors at insolvency. 61 Upon litigation, the courts
had to characterize the nature of the security interest in terms of
law, which was potentially at odds with the parties' expressed
wording on the charge documents. 62 An abundant area of
litigation occurred in relation to fixed charges over book debts
(otherwise known as accounts receivables).63 Book debts are
revolving assets that should have been suitable subject matter for
the floating charge. Book debts are also commonly used as
security because many businesses do not have any other
substantial asset to offer as security. Hence, book debts have
become a major source of security for credit financing, and lenders
have tried to frame their security over book debts as a fixed charge
in order to trump preferential creditors in the event of insolvency.
However, whether and to what extent fixed charges may take over
a revolving asset such as book debts became a hotly contested
issue between lenders and liquidators. This issue surfaced in 1979
and was not settled by the House of Lords until June 2005.
Defining fixed and floating charges has raised concerns among
61 Adrian Owen, Fixed Charges over Book Debts-The Latest Threat, 1 J. INT'L

FIN. MARKETS 241 (1999) (providing a practitioner's view of drafting charge instruments
for lender clients).
62 See Street v. Mountford, [1985] A.C. 809, 826. See also GOODE, supra note 14,
at 3-29, in which Professor Goode opines that English courts generally give effect to
parties' intentions, and are responsive to commercial needs as long as the market practice
is not unreasonable. However, courts would still not rubber-stamp parties' intentions if
parties had made odd characterizations. In fact, how the court would construe a charge
instrument now is a matter of law in two stages, first to determine the nature of the rights
parties intended to create, and then it is for the courts to categorize that into the type of
security interest most appropriate under law. See Re Brumark Inv. Ltd., Agnew v.
Comm'r of Inland Revenue, [2001] 2 A.C. 710, 725.
63 See infra Part III.A.
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policy-makers who recognized that the insolvency policy gives
some creditors preferential treatment. The legislature has enacted
the Enterprise Act of 2002 to reduce the pool of preferential
creditors by removing the Crown from the pool but not actually
abolishing the concept altogether. Therefore, it has minimally
improved the attractiveness of the floating charge and prevented
lenders from trying to fit into the fixed charge as many
arrangements as are possible.64
The uncertainties surrounding the fixed and floating charge are
not a satisfactory state for commercial law, as one of the needs of
a competitive jurisdiction is the predictability of its commercial
laws.65 If commercial lenders cannot be sure of the nature of
security they have taken, that may affect lending decisions and the
availability of credit. However, it is inherent in any legal system
that there would be gaps. Thus, balanced against the inherent
nature of any legal framework, would the uncertainties in English
law in the nature of fixed and floating charges be regarded so
adversely? However, the way forward, as identified by Lord
Millett, is "legal interpretation" of security interests. The chief
weakness of the security law in the United Kingdom has at last
been identified as the lack of clear legal fabrication of security
interests."
The legal interpretation of security interests in the United
Kingdom has thus far occurred under a "bundling" approach. This
approach allows the definition of the nature of security to be
affected by issues relating to means of taking security as well as
priority at insolvency. This paper argues that this approach may
be the root cause of a great deal of all the litigation and unresolved
definitions.
In contrast, the American approach is to decouple the issues
of: (1) the nature of a security interest; (2) the means of taking a
security interest; and (3) priority at insolvency, so that a system of
personal property security may be constructed using simplified
64 It remains to be seen how far the Enterprise Act of 2002 may alleviate the
interpretation difficulties between fixed and floating charges. See Capper, supra note 54.
Gerard McCormack thinks the Enterprise Act of 2002 would not help towards resolving
the definitional issues in fixed and floating charges. See Gerard McCormack, The
Nature of Security Over Receivables, 23 Co. LAW. 84, 86 (2002).
65 Predictability is valued in commercial law. See GOODE, supra note 14, at 14-16.
66

See Brumark, [2001] 2 A.C. 710; Spectrum, [2005] 3 WLR 58.
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and clear concepts. The prescriptions are set out in a code, and
such legal fabrication provides a comprehensive framework for
commercial developments. It is a proactive approach, albeit with
room for future responses.
The relative clarity achieved under the American system is
argued to be sound, and even if the United Kingdom does not adopt
U.S. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the methodology
of unbundling may be the answer towards a clearer legal
fabrication of security interests, in light of the United Kingdom's
inexorable march towards "interpretive substance," as called upon
by the Law Lords in the Brumark and Spectrum cases.67
A. The Bundling Approach in the United Kindgom
The United Kingdom's bundling approach relates to the
interdependence between the subject matter of the security,
and the manner of its "taking"-or in more technical terms,
"attachment" and "perfection" of the security interest-and the
relationship between the definition of a security interest and issues
of priority in insolvency.68 This is examined in relation to the
legal fabrication of the floating charge.
First, I will look at one of the earliest definitions of the floating
charge from In Re Yorkshire Woolcombers.69 A floating charge is
defined in the following extract, although the judge has expressly
said that the defining features of floating charges are not meant to
be exhaustive and that all of the characteristics need not be
present:
I certainly do not intend to attempt to give an exact definition of
the term 'floating charge', nor am I prepared to say that there
will not be a floating charge, within the meaning of the
[Companies] Act [1900], which does not contain all the three
characteristics I am about to mention, but I certainly think that if
a charge has the three characteristics that I am about to mention
it is a floating charge. (1) If it is a charge on a class of assets of
a company present and future; (2) if that class is one which, in
the ordinary course of the business of the company, would be
67 See infra Part III.A for detailed discussion.
68 For a detailed explanation of "attachment" and "perfection."

See McCormack,
supra note 49, at 70-71; see also McCORMACK, SECURED CREDIT, supra note 25.
69 See Yorkshire Woolcombers, [1903] 2 Ch. 284, 288.
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changing from time to time; and (3) if you find that by the
charge it is contemplated that, until some future step is taken by
or on behalf of those interested in the charge, the company may
carry on its business in the ordinary way as far as concerns the
particular class of assets I am dealing with.7 °
The three characteristics in In Re Yorkshire Woolcombers refer
to the type of subject matter the charge may take over, that is,
"present and future" assets, or a continuous flow of assets, that
change from time to time. The nature of the assets allows turnover
and relatively quick replacement of the same type of subject
matter. Next, the definition refers to how the security interest is
taken, and only at a point in time to which the parties agree the
exact pool of assets would be attached to the secured lender
(otherwise known as "crystallization"). Thus, the classic definition
of the floating charge already bundles up the nature of the subject
matter that could be subject to a floating charge with the manner
of its taking to determine if a floating charge exists. There is
nothing objectionable about this if the conceptual definition of the
floating charge results in a marriage of the two components.
However, as there are two components, whenever grey areas are
encountered, lawyers would dissect the two components in order
to weigh which matters more to the definition. This is the
weakness of the definition: no conceptual thought has been given
to the exact relationship or weight of the two components relative
to the other. This is manifested in the examples of case law
discussed below.
In Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc.,7' an assignment of
current rent benefits was collected for equipment that was
leased out. This assignment was regarded as a fixed charge, as the
charge dealt with "present" and not "present and future assets."
However, the rent benefits were not attached to the secured lender
as they were collected and would be used in the ordinary course of
business until default occurred. Therefore, the rent benefits were a
type of revolving asset and not a specific asset. One would have
thought that the revolving nature of the asset would make the
charge a floating one. However, the court held that as the
assignment dealt with "present" assets, this was sufficient for a
70

Id. at 295.

71

See Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc., [1992] Ch. 505 (CA).
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fixed charge. The nature of the charge in this case depended on
the nature of the present assets and not the manner of taking.
Many commentators doubt the correctness of this case,72 but it
highlights the difficulty one faces in applying a definition which is
plagued with grey areas.
In Holroyd v. Marshall,73 the court allowed future machinery
to be taken under a fixed charge. Because it could be described
with specificity and had relative permanence, the machinery could
be attached to the charge once it came into being. This level of
specificity in the asset created a valid fixed charge, even though
the future machinery did not yet exist. In Re Cimex Tissues,74 the
chargor had the relative freedom to deal with the forklift truck
subject to the charge, including the sale and mortgage of the truck.
Here, the chargor could use the assets as if they were
unencumbered, as though those assets were under a floating
charge. The court held that the charge was fixed because the
nature of the asset was specific and it could attach to the charge
immediately. Thus, in Holroyd and Re Cimex Tissues, the type of
subject matter was more important than the degree of chargor
control over the assets in determining whether there was a fixed
charge.
In Re Cosslett ContractorsLtd.,75 the opposite conclusion was
reached with respect to a charge over a class of assets including a
coal washing plant. The charge was held to be floating because
the chargor had freedom to remove the plant without the chargee's
consent, even though the coal washing plant was sufficiently
specific and could attach immediately to the charge. That case
turned on the degree of chargor control rather than on the nature of
the asset.
The testing of the Yorkshire Woolcombers bundled definition
of the "floating charge" was perhaps most severe in the book debt
cases. The history of the book debt cases started with Siebe
Gorman & Co. Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd.,76 in which a purported
72 See Capper, supra note 54, at 330; Fidelis Oditah, Fixed Charges and Recycling
of Proceeds of Receivables, 120 L. Q. REV. 533 (2004).
73 See Marshall (1862) 10 H.L.C. 191.
74
75
76

See Re Cimex Tissues, [1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 409.
See Re Cosslett Contractors Ltd., [1998] Ch. 495, 501.
See Barclays Bank Ltd., [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 142.
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fixed charge was taken over the company's present and future
book debts. The book debts had to be paid into a specified
account with Barclays Bank, the lender, and although there were
no express restrictions on the company's use of the proceeds in the
account, Judge Slade thought that the chargee bank could impose
restrictions, as it was within its power to do so and therefore had
sufficient control over the proceeds.
The potential of the
chargee's power to control the proceeds sufficed to create a fixed
charge. In the later case of Re Keenan Bros.,7 7 the Irish Supreme
Court refused to find a fixed charge over book debts unless there
was express control over the account by the chargee with respect
to the proceeds that were paid into the account. This was affirmed
in Re Brightlife.78 It seems that clearing banks had an advantage
when taking security over book debts. Here, clearing banks could
more easily argue that they had control over the account that the
book debts were paid into, and therefore the clearing banks had a
fixed charge over those debts. Non-clearing banks would find it
difficult to argue that they had a fixed charge if they could not
effectively control the proceeds of book debts collected by the
chargors.7 9 However, it was not clear what degree of control over
proceeds sufficed for a charge over book debts to be a fixed
charge.8 ° In Siebe Gorman, the judge opined that the possibility of
chargee control sufficed as actual control, but this was rejected in
Keenan Bros. and Brightlife. Consequently, if we accept that
some form of actual control is needed over the account for the
chargee to have a fixed charge over the book debts in that account,
how would actual control be arranged in light of the chargor's
need to access the proceeds for day-to-day business operations?
The following inquiries must be made: (1) would the chargor have
to ask for permission at each withdrawal; 81 (2) could the chargee
77 See Re Keenan Bros., [1986] B.C.L.C. 242, 247.

See Re Brightlife, [1987] Ch. 200, 215.
79 F. Oditah, Fixed Charges over Book Debts After Brumark, 14
78

INSOLVENCY

INTELLIGENCE 49 (2001).

80 Christopher Brown, Re New Bullas Trading Ltd.-When is a Fixed Charge Not a
Fixed Charge, 8 J. INT'L. BANKING L. REG. 381, 388 (1993).

81 Oditah, supra note 79; see also Robert A Pearce, Fixed Charges over Book
Debts 18 J. Bus. L. 18, 29 (1987) (giving academic affirmation to the creation of fixed
charges over book debts but warning that control over proceeds has to be provided to
secure a fixed charge for the chargee).
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give blanket consent; (3) could the chargee arrange for monies to
be released in fixed amounts over periods of time; 82 (4) would it be
sufficient if83 the chargee ensured that the account was not
overdrawn?
In Re Brumark,84 a Privy Council case from New Zealand, it
was stated that only a blocked account, operated in fact and not by
name, would suffice as sufficient control for a fixed charge over
book debts to be taken. Questions regarding the mechanics of the
blocked account remained 85 as no definition for the blocked
account was provided. In In Re Spectrum Plus, 86 the House of
Lords finally defined what a blocked account is, stating that it
should be a specified account where the proceeds are kept for the
security of the chargee and such monies should be frozen and not
be at the disposal of the chargor, without the written consent of the
chargee. 87 The definitional issue seems to have been resolved by
the House of Lords' specific pronouncement on what suffices as
control of book debts to be sufficient for a fixed charge.
Understanding the issues regarding the nature of a security
interest and the taking of the interest is essential to identifying
82 Jessica Young, Charge over Book Debts: Siebe Gorman Revisited, 15 INT'L CO.
& COM. L. REV. 327 (2004).
83 Andrew Petersen, The End of New Bullas, 23 Co. L. 24, 25 (2002).
84 Brumark, [2001] 2 A.C. 710.
85

Oditah, supra note 79.

86 Re Spectrum, [2005] 3 WLR 58.
87 The Court of Appeal in Spectrum, [2004] EWHC 9; [2004] 1 All E.R. 981,
upheld the fixed charge over receivables as the receivables could not be disposed of or
assigned but could only be collected. The proceeds were to be paid into a specified
account without further controls. The Court of Appeal's holding is based on two
assumptions. First, the Court was bound by the earlier case of Re New Bullas on a
similar charge instrument. Second, the Court considered that Siebe Gorman allowed for
the proliferation of commercial expectations that fixed charges could be quite easily
taken over book debts, and it would not be in commercial interests to disrupt that. The
Spectrum decision in the Court of Appeal has been supported by Alan Berg, who argues
that if a debtor were required to pay the collected proceeds into a bank account and that
account was always overdrawn, the money paid in was always used to satisfy the
overdraft debt. The overdraft facility could be stopped by the bank; therefore, the bank
had ample control over the proceeds, which made the charge over the proceeds fixed in
In Re Spectrum, supra note 1. This is distinguished from Siebe Gorman where the
account was in credit. See Fixed Charges Over Book Debts: Spectrum, 17 INSOLVENCY
INTELLIGENCE 33 (2004); Alan Berg, Charges Over Book Debts: The Spectrum Case in
the Court ofAppeal,, J. Bus. L., 2004, at 581, 587.
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difficulties in determining whether a charge over book debts is a
fixed charge. Book debts have a continuous and revolving nature,
satisfying the first two elements of In Re Yorkshire Woolcombers.
Therefore, whether the charge over book debts is fixed or floating
depends on the third element dealing with means of taking.88 The
third element seems to suggest that the floating charge is
characterized by the chargor's freedom to deal with the pool of
assets; therefore, the converse must be true in that limits to such
freedom would make the charge a fixed charge. Commentators89
and the Law Commission 9 accept that the degree of control over
the asset was key to whether a fixed or floating charge was created
over book debts. However, if book debts were to be identified and
attached specifically to the secured lender, then many businesses
relying on book debts to facilitate their cash flow would be
seriously affected. Therefore, lenders and borrowers tried to find a
balance between allowing the lenders sufficient control over the
proceeds of the book debts and allowing businesses to have access
to the proceeds. Academics, 9' practitioners,92 and the judiciary
split hairs over what is sufficient control to satisfy the requirement
of the fixed charge, 93 rendering the definition confused and
complex. 94 Although the exact mechanics of control have now
88 Andrew McKnight, Brumark: The Difference Between Fixed and Floating

Charges, 16 J. INT'L. BANKING L. REG. 157, 158 (2001). In fact, Professor Sarah
Worthington is of the view that degree of control is the only simple and explicit criterion
for distinguishing between fixed and floating charges. See Sarah Worthington, Fixed
Charges over Book Debts and Other Receivables, 113 L. Q. REV. 562, 562 (2001).
89 Worthington, supra note 88; Oditah, supra note 79.
90

Law Commission, supra note 11,

3.159-60.

91 See D.W. McLauchlan, Fixed Charges over Book Debts: New Bullas in New
Zealand, 115 L. Q. REv. 365, 367 (1999); Roger Gregory & Peter Walton, Book Debt
Charges-The Saga Goes On, 115 L. Q. REv. 14, 15 (1999).
92 Practitioners Stephen Atherton and R.J. Mokal came up with nine complex
guidelines for distinguishing between fixed and floating charges. See Stephen Atherton
& R.J. Mokal, Charges Over Chattels: Issues in the Fixed-Floating Jurisprudence,26
Co. LAW. 10 (2005); see also Young, supra note 82.
93 G. Moss, Fixed Charges in Book Debts: Puzzles and Perils, 8 INSOLVENCY
INTELLIGENCE 25 (1995).
94 Furthermore, there was also the argument that control over book debts should
not depend on post-contractual conduct but on pre-contractual agreements. It is unusual
to depend on post-contractual conduct in ascertaining parties' intentions to a contract.
See Oditah, supra note 79; G. McMeel, PriorNegotiations and Subsequent ConductThe Next Step Forwardfor ContractualInterpretation, 119 L. Q. REV. 272 (2003); M.
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been settled by Re Spectrum, the case has made the fixed charge
over book debts an extremely unattractive option for lenders and
borrowers, as it provides that absolute control is needed for a fixed
charge over book debts.
It could be argued that absolute control is not itself an essential
characteristic of many fixed charges held good under U.K. law. In
Re Cimex Tissues, the chargee allowed the chargor to have a
certain extent of freedom in dealing with the forklift truck subject
to the charge. Further, in fixed charges taken over future property,
the fact that future property is not in existence and acquisition
depends on the chargor's discretion, this signifies that the chargee
does not have absolute control over the asset. To require absolute
control over book debts seems too stringent for the requirements
of the fixed charge, as other precedents have shown more
flexibility. It remains to be seen whether the parameters laid down
in Re Cimex Tissues will adversely affect commerce.
Spectrum shows that legal fabrication of security interests in
the United Kingdom is still weak under the bundling approach.
There has been no attempt to explain how the conceptual
definitions of security and means of taking are bundled, if they
should even be bundled at all. Furthermore, the bundling
approach in the United Kingdom handicaps the development of
U.K. law with respect to new ideas in taking security. For
example, security interests could provide for shared or convertible
forms of control over the security. A charge which was drafted as
fixed under certain conditions would become floating under other
conditions. How would the law regard such a charge? This kind
of charge would defy the traditional categories of fixed and
floating charges. Would the law be able to accommodate these
novel commercial developments?95
Where practitioners
are concerned, the label of the instrument is not as important
as its results. Therefore, is the law too archaic for the needs of
commerce because it subjects novel instruments to traditional
categorization? 96 In the alternative, could it be argued that it is the

Fennessy & L. Tamlyn, Fixed and Floating Charges: Brumark, INSOLVENCY LAW.,
2002, at 56; Philip Smart, Fixed or Floating: Siebe Gorman post-Brumark, 25 CO. LAW.
331 (2004).
95 Alan Berg, Charges Over Book Debts-A Reply, J. Bus. L., 1995, at 433.
96 Peter Watts, The Rendering of Charges, 118 L. Q. REV. 1, 4 (2002).
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lenders and borrowers that have to be disciplined
through limits on
97
when they could give or obtain credit?
I will discuss the bundling approach taken in respect to the
issue of defining security interests and priorities at insolvency. An
innovative, but ultimately rejected, security instrument was tested
in the case of Re New Bullas Trading Ltd.98 In that case, the
chargee was not a clearing bank and purported to take a fixed
charge over book debts by giving the chargor only the freedom to
collect the receivables but not to assign them, and upon collection
of the proceeds, the chargee would take a floating charge over the
proceeds. It is crucial that the chargee secures his rights as "fixed"
before the company dissolves. The charge instrument was drafted
this way in recognition of this fact. On the eve of winding up, if
there were any receivables that could be realized by the liquidator,
they would be subject to the fixed charge, and the chargee would
rank ahead of preferential creditors. The Court of Appeal upheld
the New Bullas "split" charge as good and held that there could be
a fixed charge over the unrealized book debts, and a subsequent
floating charge over the realized proceeds. The Court of Appeal
used a tree and fruit analogy to describe the unrealized book debts
as a tree, and the realized proceeds as fruit separate from the tree,
concluding that and thus, there could be two charges over two
conceptually different assets.
The question of whether the charge over book debts could be
split into two stages generated great academic controversy. Some
prominent commentators fervently argued that book debts and
proceeds are one continuing security interest,99 while others
97 It has been suggested that cultural perceptions of debt may affect the legal
framework for credit and insolvency in a jurisdiction, and in the United Kingdom, the
cultural perception of debt is not as liberal and forgiving as in the United States. See
Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and

Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation,28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
1 (2005). Therefore, it may be argued that Brumark and Spectrum manifest the more
conservative culture of the United Kingdom, and prominent judges have decided that
borrowers and lenders cannot always structure their credit agreements in the novel ways
they wish.
98 Re New Bullas Trading Ltd., [1994] 1 B.C.L.C. 36.
99 Roy Goode, Fixed Charges over Book Debts-A Missed Opportunity, 110 L. Q.
REv. 592 (1994). Lord Millett delivered the judgment of Re Brumark, disapproved of
the split charges drafting in New Bullas, and specifically overturning the case.
Commentators supporting the Goode view include Capper, supra note 54; Felicity
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favored the split approach." °° However, some commentators
criticized the Court of Appeal for supporting the split charge
phenomenon while disallowing the fixed charge over the
receivables. Because the chargor had the autonomy to collect the
proceeds and to decide the destination of the proceeds,1"' the
chargee did not have enough control over the receivables to have a
fixed charge. The issue of how much control a chargee needed to
have over the asset to have a fixed charge resurfaced; it seemed
that the Court of Appeal did not analyze whether the fixed charge
over the book debt receivables should be regarded as fixed in law,
but merely rubber-stamped the parties' intentions.10 2 All in all, the
issue of the definition of a fixed or floating charge became acute
because of the priority issue, 10 3 and there were fears that in
interpreting the charge, the parties could have to drive a coach and
horses through Parliament's insolvency policy."° The bundling of
the definition and priority issues is arguably unnecessary if the
United Kingdom adopted clearer conceptual delineations between
the definition of a security interest, means of taking of a security
interest, and priorities. There is now sufficient recognition in the
United Kingdom that interpretive issues have to be resolved. In
Brumark, Lord Millet authoritatively stated that categorizing the
nature of the security interest was a matter of law, 10 5 and thus
affirming the law's role to provide the legal framework in which
the policy at insolvency would apply. The approach is affirmed in
Spectrum, where it was stated that the categorization of security
interests would depend on the "nature and substance of the
Toube, Fixed or Floating ChargedAssets, 13 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 22 (2000).
100 Robert R. Pennington, The Interchangeabilityof Fixed and FloatingCharges, 24
Co. LAW. 60 (2003) (exploring the possibility of convertible charges, or a charge that is
created first as a fixed charge and then becomes a floating charge); see also Berg, supra
note 95, where it is suggested that distinguishing between a receivable interest and its
proceeds is not conceptually an error.
101 See Worthington, supra note 88; see also, Robert Walker, Fixed and Floating
Charges: The Debate Continues, 3 INSOLVENCY LAW. 78 (2002).
102 Stephen Griffin, The Effect of a Charge over Book Debts: The Indivisible or

Divisible Nature of the Charge?, 46 N. IRELAND L. Q. 163 (1995).
103 The preservation of Parliament's policy of favoring preferential creditors became
dependent on the judicial interpretation of what is a fixed and floating charge; see
Michael G. Bridge, Fixed Chargesand Freedom of Contract,110 L. Q. REv. 340 (1994).
104 Id.
105 Brumark, [2001] 2 A.C. 710,
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arrangement"10 6 between the lender and borrower. 0 7 Thus, the
judiciary clearly recognized the need for what I would term "a
legal fabrication of security interests in the United Kingdom."
The call to look beyond parties' intentions to the "substance" of
the arrangement is new, and seems to introduce a guiding principle
to interpretation that may be based on the function of the financing
arrangement. The Law Commission in its recent proposal did not
expressly say that security interests should be defined in terms of a
functional approach, but its recommendation as to what should be
registered as a company charge includes most forms of
transactions that were in substance a security.'0 8 Hence, it could
be argued that there is much support for adoption of a "substance"
based approach in interpreting security interests by the United
Kingdom.
B. Unbundling in the United States and the Functional
Approach
In the United States, early case law'0 9 that stunted free

development of financing arrangements led to a movement to
reconceptualize security arrangements and provide a total legal
framework to address credit and security. This resulted in the
construction of a comprehensive legal framework under Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code. Article 9 provides a functional
definition of a security interest, so that any financing arrangement
that provides a secured lending effect will be a security
arrangement."0 Therefore, retention of title financing would be
regarded as a security arrangement in the United States, though
not in the United Kingdom.
Article 9 also unbundles the definition issue from the means of
106 Id.,

32.

107 2005 WL 1505126,1 116; Spectrum, 2 A.C. 680 (2005).

108 For example, the Law Commission, supra note 11, pt. 4 (recommending making
sales of receivables registrable); see also id. 3.19-3.29 (recommending pledges which
allowed possession of the asset to remain with the debtor). However, the Law
Commission was silent on the issue of agency sales financing and specific purpose trusts
although these transactions may have financing aspects. Title reservation was also
expressly excluded from registration. See id. 1.60-66.
109 Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
110 See U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (2005) defines security interest as "an interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." Id.
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taking security. The concepts relating to means of taking security
are "attachment" and "perfection." Security has to be attached and
perfected. Attachment refers to the point in time when the security
interest becomes valid between the lender and borrower.
Perfection is when the interest becomes effective against third
parties. Security interests may be taken by possession, which
serves both as attachment and perfection, or by filing a financing
statement, which perfects a security interest attached by contractual
agreement. Commercial developments in security with novel
qualities, such as deposit accounts, have created developments in
the concepts of attachment and perfection. Deposit accounts have
to be taken by "control" over the asset, and "control" is elaborately
defined in Article 9. U.C.C. § 9-104-107 (2005). Finally, the issue
of priority is also unbundled as secured lenders generally have full
priority except in specific cases such as with purchase money
security. Purchase money security is money advanced in order to
acquire an asset that is the subject of the security. It ranks ahead
of other interests in that asset."'
The approach in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) has been praised for attaining interpretive and conceptual
clarity, as well as setting up a reliable system of registration which
lenders can rely on when making lending decisions. This has led
to the development of cheaper and more efficient provisions of
credit, and less litigation. 112 Article 9 provides three distinct
conceptual elements in security law: the definition of security
interest; the means of taking in the concepts of attachment and
perfection; and priorities at insolvency. This avoids the bundling
problems experienced in the United Kingdom.
However, there is more to Article 9 than meets the eye.
Although conceptually unbundled, the three concepts are by no
means easily conceptualized. First, although the definition of a
security interest is functional, there is still a need to prescribe what
111 U.C.C. § 9-103 (2005) defines "purchase money security interest" and U.C.C. §
9-324 (2005) provides for its super-priority. See MCCORMACK, SECURED CREDIT, supra
note 25, at 73-79.
112 This is generally agreed to in A. Diamond, A Review of Security Interests in
Property (H.M.S.O. 1989), a report submitted in the eighties to the U.K. government for
reform of personal property security law, which was never adopted. See also Mark
Lawson, The Reform of the Law Relating to Security Interests in Property, J. Bus. L.,
1987, at 287(discussing the report).
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financing arrangements may be accepted as having created
security interests. As commercial needs evolve, the types of
financing instruments change, and novel types of financing
instruments have to be considered as to whether or not they
created security interests.
The characterization problem of
security interests is inherent in both the United States and the
United Kingdom." 3
Second, the means of taking security could change with the
emergence of new assets and new methodologies of taking
interests over assets. As novel types of security interests such as
deposit accounts developed, the law had to provide for a new
means of taking the asset. Control was developed as a means of
taking an interest that would trump registration in respect to the
same asset. Amendments to Article 9114 were made in order to

allow security to be taken over deposit accounts, with the means of
taking deposit accounts as security by "control." ' 1 5 "Control"
would trump registration in respect to deposit accounts,
investment properties, and letter-of-credit rights." 6 Therefore,
priority determined by time of filing would be subverted where
"control" is stipulated to be a stronger perfection mechanism. As
such, it could be argued that priority by control is a form of
bundling, as the priority issue is determined by the means of
taking a security interest. Article 9's clarity is challenged by novel
commercial developments that compel concepts to be bundled.
However, Article 9 still achieves relative clarity compared to
bundling in the United Kingdom, as "control" is very specifically
117
defined in relation to each asset capable of perfection by control.
Furthermore, as political pressure for priority issues has been
113 In 1999, specific amendments were made to Article 9 to allow the creation of
security interests to be created over letters of credit, health care insurance, leasehold
interests, promissory notes, and other instruments, in spite of contractual restrictions.
See U.C.C. § 9-406-409. See also Michael L Owen, Reforms of the law of Secured
Transactions in Mexico and the US, 10 US-MEX. L.J. 99 (2002). See also McCormack,
Rewriting the English Law of Personal Property Securities, supra note 49; see also
McCormack, PersonalPropertySecurity Law Reform, supra note 15.
114 U.C.C. Permanent Editorial Board Study Group, Use of Deposit Accounts as
OriginalCollateral,3 A. L. I. (1992).
115 U.C.C. § 9-327. "Control" is defined in U.C.C. § 9-104.
116 U.C.C. § 9-327, 9-328, & 9-329.

117U.C.C. § 9-104, 9-105, 9-106, & 9-107.
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mounted by different lobbying groups, carve-outs from full
priority in secured lending have been provided in Article 9,118 and
it has been hypothesized that the process of drafting the U.C.C. is
too heavily influenced by political pressures." 9 The apparent
conceptual clarity of Article 9 is deceptive. The reality is that Article
9 has been modified over the years and the rules regarding
120
attachment, perfection, and priorities have become rather complex.
However, what is commendable is that Article 9 concepts are by and
large not bundled; the type of security interest is not defined by the
means of taking or insolvency priority. This arguably allows finer
sophistications to be developed within each concept. Although the
three concepts are evolving, the relative superiority in the clarity
of Article 9 is still quite evident compared to the bundled approach
in the United Kingdom.
That is not to say that importing Article 9 into the United
Kingdom would largely resolve the interpretive issues brought
about by bundling. Article 9 is a system of its own, and the United
Kingdom has already evolved a system that commercial players
how to navigate. In marrying the two systems, various problems
may occur. The importation of Article 9 into U.K. law may cause
the demise of the floating charge, which is cherished in the United
Kingdom.12' The Law Commission has tried both to preserve the
floating charge as while still introducing an Article 9 type
registration system in its proposals,'22 but some have argued that
this is not quite possible.'23 There are problems in streamlining the
floating charge with Article 9 concepts such as attachment and
perfection. The floating charge becomes fixed upon the floating
class of assets at the point in time of crystallization.' 24 However,
118 Article 9 was amended in 1999 to provide for the subordination of perfected
security interests by filing to lien creditors over goods, such as buyers or lessees of
goods, or licensees of intangibles under certain conditions. See U.C.C. § 9-317-322.
119 See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of
Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. Rev. 595, 638-50 (1995); see also Robert E. Scott,
The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783, 1810 (1994).

120 See supra note 118 for discussion of Article 9 amendments.
121 Law Commission, supra note 11,

3.164.

122 See Law Commission, supra note 11,
123 Gerard

McCormack,

3.158.

The Floating Charge and the

Law Commission's

Consultation Paperon Registration of Security Interests, I INSOLVENCY LAW. 2 (2003).

124 Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Ass'n Ltd., (1903) 2 Ch. 284.
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crystallization is an alien notion to both attachment and perfection.
In order to reconcile the two systems, it may be that crystallization
has to be regarded as an event that should be registered again to be
perfected, but that would be very cumbersome for lenders. Or
should the idea of crystallization be done away with so that
the charge is essentially regarded as a fixed interest over a class
of assets which may be revolving?125
If this change in
characterization occurs, then one advantage to the uncrystallized
floating charge, which is the possibility of execution creditors
taking from the class of assets before crystallization to satisfy
judgment debts, would be lost; the charge would be characterized
as a "fixed" one. 126 Importing Article 9 would also mean that
reconciliation with the existing company's charges register has to
be made and a new registry dealing with personal property
security financing statements would have to be set up. This may
create costs in terms of public regulation. 127 The Law Commission
suggested the implementation of an Article 9 type registration
system to replace the existing company charges register, and then
further review as to its more general extension may be undertaken
in the future. However, the Law Commission realized that
significant costs are associated with reconciling all the existing
registers of security interests, including Land Registers, and
registers of security interests taken over ships, aircraft and
intellectual property. 128 Taking a step back from the technical
questions of how to import Article 9 into the United Kingdom, one
should not conclude too quickly that Article 9 is the answer for the
125 This view could be supported by Sarah Worthington's "defeasible charge
theory" of the floating charge, where the floating charge is regarded as a fixed charge
with a license to deal. The charge is defeasible when the charger deals with the assets
within the ambit of the license. See generally Sarah Worthington, Floating Charges-An
Alternative Theory, 53 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 81 (1994). However, Professor Worthington
seems to have adopted new views of the floating charge, as her comments against the
split charges phenomenon in the Bullas Trading case seem to suggest that there is a clear
difference between the fixed charge and floating charge, and the floating charge is
premised upon the ability of the chargor to remove assets from the ambit of the charge.
Worthington, supra note 88.
126 However, this position is recommended by the Law Commission.
Law
Commission, supra note 11, 3.201-204, at 79-80.
127 Iwan Davies, Floating Charges and Reform of PersonalProperty Legislation,9
Co. LAW. 47 (1988).

128 Law Commission, supra note 11,

3.231-35, at 86-7.
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United Kingdom's weak legal fabrication of security interests.
The methodology in Article 9, that is, the unbundled approach,
may be a step that the United Kingdom should follow first in order
to achieve conceptual clarity.
Since the introduction of
preferential creditors into the priorities system in insolvency, there
has been a need to firm up the legal interpretation of security
interests. The policy, which is framed in the existing language,
could then be effectively enforced. This need to firm up the legal
interpretation of security interests was not given full articulation
until recently in Re Brumark.12 9 Thus, courts are only beginning to
follow the guidance of the House of Lords in the direction of legal
interpretation. 130 The new landscape of legal interpretation may
give rise to future chasms between what commercial lenders have
defined as security interests and the courts' language of
interpretation. The need for clear legal fabrication of security
interests should quickly be met in the interests of commercial
expediency.
C. Proposalfor an UnbundledApproach
In this paper, I recommend that the conceptually unbundled
approach taken in the United States should be followed in the
United Kingdom's progress towards legal fabrication of security
interests.
The unbundled approach consists of three main
conceptual pillars: (1) the definition of a security interest, (2) the
means of taking such security to be valid against the borrower and
third parties, and (3) the priorities for secured lenders in
insolvency. Although the three concepts are not themselves
simple concepts capable of easy definition, the unbundling
approach should treat them as three distinct concepts, and then the
three concepts can each be fleshed out in a more sophisticated
fashion, and their overlaps can be drawn out.
In terms of the definition of security interest, the United
Kingdom has to choose between the formal approach and the
substance approach. The substantive approach, which may be
based on the functional approach taken in the United States, would
provide characterization of a security transaction based on the
effect of the transaction. If the transaction has the effect of
129 Agnew, [2001] A.C. 710.
130 In Re Spectrum, [2005] 3 WLR 58.
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providing financing, the transaction should be regarded as a
security arrangement. The formal approach would be based upon
construction of parties' intention in the contract, and if parties
intended to provide financing, then a security arrangement arises.
However, if the arrangement provides for transfers of legal title or
retention of legal title, then it is a transfer and not a security
arrangement. The formal approach would retain much of what is
familiar to the legal community in the United Kingdom, but that
may be undesirable for legal fabrication of security interests
because it may undermine the conceptual unity of security
interests. However, the substance approach may raise issues as to
whether trusts and other quasi-security would become defined as
security interests as well.13 ' There would also be a need to
consider the relationship between the parties in the financing
arrangement, and if custodianship and fiduciary duties are involved,
whether these transactions should be regarded as security
transactions. The Law Commission seems to prefer the substantive
legal fabrication
approach, but it does not present a comprehensive
132
of security interests in the United Kingdom.
If novel means of taking assets may arise, this paper posits that
the means of taking should not daunt the legislator. Rather, a
general rule is that any legal means of taking could confer a right
in rem in the asset in question, and there should not be restrictions
on how an asset may be taken as security. The key issue lies in the
strength of the security as a result of the parties' chosen means of
taking. The original Article 9 arguably did not provide for the
concept of security strength. Rather, all security was ranked
according to the time the financing statement was filed, and hence,
all security had an equal status regardless of how it was created.
But as discussed, Article 9 has over the years provided carve-outs
from the full priority status of registered security.
It now provides that control over deposit accounts may entail a
stronger security than registration, so that a registered creditor
without control may lose priority to a subsequently registered
creditor with control. The carve-out from full priority also extends
to some lien creditors over goods in Articles 9-317 through 9131 J. A. Glister, Trusts as Quasi Securities? The Law Commission's Proposalsfor
the Registrationof Security Interests, LLOYD'S MAR. & COMM. L.Q. 460 (2004).
1.60-66, at 18-20.
132 See Law Commission, supra note 11,
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322.133 Thus, the more general concept of security strength should
be introduced in legal fabrication of security interests, even under
Article 9. Although the Law Commission wishes to follow the
American approach of ranking by time of filing, it also imports the
idea that control is superior to registration, and even distinguishes
between positive and negative control, 134 recommending that
negative control be regarded as stronger than positive control.
Thus, it is submitted that a comprehensive overview of security
strength should be undertaken for the purposes of ranking, and that
time of filing should determine ranking only amongst security
interests with the same degree of strength.
The Law Commission faced the dilemma that if it
recommended that ranking should depend on time of filing, then
floating charges filed first would have priority over subsequent
fixed charges. However, the Enterprise Act of 2002 still provides
for preferential creditors to take priority over floating charges and
not fixed charges. 35 The Law Commission recommends that, as a
matter of practice, it will be likely that lenders will demand that
borrowers seek the consent of floating charge holders to defer
priority to the subsequent fixed charge. There would be no
conundrums in applying the priority policy in the Enterprise Act.
If an odd situation like that described above occurred, the Law
Commission recommends that the floating charge holder and the
subsequent fixed charge holder should both have priority over the
preferential creditor. 136 This outcome contradicts the wording of
the Enterprise Act and means that if a borrower subjected property
already charged to a floating charge holder to another fixed
charge, the affected floating charge holder's position would
actually improve because it would go ahead of the preferential
creditor. If the borrowers were scrupulous and did not charge the
property again, the floating charge holder would be in the worse
position of being subordinated to the preferential creditor. This
odd situation would be averted if clearer fabrication is provided
regarding the strengths of different security interests. The Law
Commission's awkward recommendation shows that there is a
133 U.C.C. § 9-317-322 (2005).

134 Law Commission, supra note 11, 5.76, 5.81, 5.85-94, at 136-40.
135 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 40, § 59 (Eng.).
136 Law Commission, supra note 11, 3.181-87, at 74-6.
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need to reconcile the idea of security strength with priorities.
In determining strength of security, it could be argued that the
strongest takings of security would be: transfers of legal title with
reservation or equity of redemption, or possession of negotiable
instruments or other chattel with an undisputed right to dispose.
Weaker forms of security would include possession without a right
to resell (a lien), possession with limited rights of disposal and
account, and contractual charges with various terms that may
control or restrict the chargor's dealings in the asset in question.
Therefore, a strong security results from a party's decision to
transfer legal title with an equity of redemption. If parties choose
to hand over possession of a bill of lading, that is a strong security.
However, if parties instead assign chattel paper subject to
contractual agreement that there is no right of transfer without
consent, that is a weaker form of security, just as parties who
choose to take a contractual right over possible enforcement
against an asset that remains in the debtor's possession is a weaker
security. The law should also consider how many degrees of
strengths and weaknesses it wishes to prescribe based on different
degrees of possessory rights, contractual rights, and ownership
rights. An asset could be taken as security in many different ways.
While the way it is taken should not be restricted in law, the means
of taking should be fabricated in law to interpret the effect of such
taking, that is, whether a stronger or weaker security has been
created. Furthermore, in determining the means of taking, the law
should provide for the validity of the security inter partes as well
as against third parties. This article suggests that validity against
third parties should be achieved in a manner that is as streamlined
as possible with the taking of security between creditor and debtor.
This means that perfection of a security interest should not involve
too many cumbersome and extraneous steps after attachment,
although certain types of attachment automatically suffice as
perfection, such as possession and control. The Article 9 approach
of registration is the simplest method of perfection, as it requires
only one extra step of filing after parties have concluded their
transactions.
The United Kingdom's approach to perfection is very
compartmentalized, and different transactions require different
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methods of perfection.'37 Where assignments or charges over
debts are concerned, perfection is very cumbersome because
notice to the account debtor must be given. This is the oftcriticized rule in Dearie v. Hall.'38 Thus, in the legal fabrication of
security interests in the United Kingdom, reform is necessary in
regards to how parties who have concluded a security transaction
may perfect that security interest to the world. The means of
perfection should be kept as simple as possible in the interests of
commercial expediency, without compromising the effectiveness
of the perfection which is meant to benefit third parties. In this
light, a registration system centrally run and maintained, like that
established under Article 9, would be superior. 3 9
Finally, priorities should conceptually be a separate issue from
definition and means of taking, although they would be affected
by different security strengths. This is an area where there could
be conceptual interdependence between the means of taking a
security interest and the priority of a security interest. A policy
choice should be made in order to rank strong forms of security
over weaker forms of security; between equally strong security
interests, the first in time of filing should prevail. The entry of
preferential creditors would also have to be decided. If legal
fabrication is to be carried out successfully, the legal fabrication of
priorities in the Enterprise Act of 2002 would have to be aligned
with the language in legal fabrication of security interests.
However, it may be argued that preferring strong security
would result in lenders imposing harsher terms of credit in lieu of
strong security interests, or refusing to lend unless they could
obtain strong security. That would be undesirable for commerce.
On the other hand, lenders are not likely to kill the goose that
lays golden eggs. Lenders have an interest in preserving the
going concern of their debtors. This is to be manifested in the
existence of laws upholding composition agreements and voluntary
arrangements by companies. Lenders and borrowers may be able
to work out security arrangements that may be a combination of
strong and weak security interests in order to hedge the lender's
137

See McCormack, supra note 49.

138 Dearie v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1 (1828) (finding that priority between assignees of book
debts is determined by who first gave notice to the account debtor).
139 See Law Commission, supra note 11, 2.18, 2.20, & 2.26, at 28-9.
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position.
Giving priority according to strength does not
necessarily result in lenders taking harsh and defensive positions
and strangling credit. Defining priority according to strength may
also be necessary as new commercial developments provide
myriad types of interests that could be taken as security, and not
all security interests are equal. Evasion of the issue of classifying
stronger and weaker security does not prevent commercial
innovations from being made or lenders from trying to improve
their positions through clever drafting.
Thus, the original
straightforward priority under Article 9, as granted according to
time of filing, may have to be modified to accommodate new
needs. This is already manifested in the amendments to Article 9,
such as the preference for control over registration where security
over deposit accounts is concerned. The figure below illustrates
the legal fabrication of security interests proposed in this article.
Legal Fabrication of
Security Interests

Means of taking

1

Attchment
a

Definitionsubstance or form?

erection

Priorities at
insolvency

1

Degrees of

attachment-security
strength
-0

IV. Options for the United Kingdom in Legal Fabrication
How may the legal fabrication of security interests, as
described in Part III.C be achieved in the United Kingdom? The
Law Commission acknowledged in a recent report that a
comprehensive review is forthcoming and was not the task of its
recent report. 140 The definition of a security interest involves a
140 Law Commission, supra note 11, [ 1.70, at 21.
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policy decision of choosing between the substance or form
approach, and whether fiduciary duties in the transaction should
make a difference to the definition. As such, policy choice may
best be undertaken by the legislature. The 1989 Diamond
Report, 14 1 which was never implemented, recommended a
substantively based functional approach to definition. The
42 Law
Commission Report arguably adopts that approach as well. 1
As to legal fabrication of the means of taking security
interests, there should also be codification in order to provide for
the concept of security strength and the factors that determine
relative strengths and weaknesses of a security. This form of
reconceptualization would be very difficult to achieve via the
incremental interpretation carried out by judges in individual
cases. The realignment of priorities in accordance with the legal
fabrication of security interests should also follow as a legislative
measure. It remains to be seen if the government would take up
the Law Commission's recent report to the legislative process.
The likeliest resistance to the Law Commission's recommendations
comes from the government itself, as it has to shoulder the cost of
running an expanded filing registry. If private law developed and
evolved to eventually clarify the interpretation of security
interests, then the interpretation of the purposes served by private
law would be the same as under codification and there would be
no need to codify now. Furthermore, there are constraints in
codification as well due to revisions that may be needed in the
future with changing commercial needs. 143 As interpretation by
courts could only be carried out when the case arises before them,
the legal interpretation of security interests could only be
developed with significant private costs in litigation. However,
such private costs may be justified. If this area of law matters
most to the private litigants themselves, then it may be appropriate
for the litigants to fund its development, rather than taxpayers.
However, the cost to the taxpayer may be minimal and may be a
benefit that outweighs the cost of private litigation. In a perverse

141 Diamond, supra note 112.
142 Supra note 108.
143 See DAWN OLIVER, COMMON VALUES AND THE PUBLIC DIVIDE (1999).

Dawn

Oliver argues there may be very little difference between the common values and
objectives served by public versus private law.
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way, private litigation costs would continue to fund commercial
lawyers who may attempt to keep the status quo at its best for their
clients. 144 In sum, legislation would provide a necessary and long
overdue comprehensive reconceptualization, but the question of
who should finance this reform remains a thorny question in the
United Kingdom.
A. Courts
Commercial lawyers may still welcome maintaining the status
quo and allowing the courts to develop the interpretive issues in
security law because the courts have recognized the crucial issue:
interpretation of security interests as a matter of law. How that
interpretation would be carried out is not so predictable, since
there is mention that "substance" of the arrangement would be
reviewed. Thus, the courts may re-categorize security instruments
in a way unforeseen by parties.
Professor Goode argues that it is not ideal to allow the
judiciary to continue as the primary agent in developing the law of
security. Here, the development of the law could be unnecessarily
complex and inelegant compared to the relative simplicity of
Article 9 of the UCC. Furthermore, judicial interpretations would
be heavily based on fact and would not be very useful for
posterity. Judges are also constrained in the number of general
statements they may make. If the judiciary re-characterizes
transactions that have been relied on for a long time, without
prospective overruling, 145 this would disturb thousands of
commercial transactions that have relied on what best seemed to
be thought of as law at that point of contracting. An ex post
system of discovering the law may be very costly for commercial
players. 146 Further, it is also argued by Professor Komesar that the
judiciary is perhaps the least appropriate institution for the
resolution of large-scale problems that affect a substantial amount
144 See McCormack, Rewriting the English Law of Personal Property Securities,

supra note 49. McCormack also refers to the inertia of the legal profession in
welcoming any change to personal property security laws in the United Kingdom.
145 The U.K. courts are highly reluctant to adopt prospective overruling.

See

Spectrum Plus, 2005 WL 1505126
4-43 (stating categorically that prospective
overruling is not part of U.K. practice and there would be many constitutional and
principled arguments to overcome before adopting the practice).
146 GOODE, supra note 14, at 59-80.
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of people. This is because increased numbers of people interested
in a legal issue would force legal rules propounded by the
judiciary to become more complex and qualified, and that would
generate more litigation in itself, becoming a vicious cycle. The
judiciary's resources are too limited to cope with this phenomenon
and the judiciary may arguably start to rely on the market or
legislature to supply the long-term solutions, and abdicate from
taking an active part in resolving the issue. 147 However, one must
bear in mind that the English judiciary has developed a
phenomenal amount of popularlV affirmed commercial law since
the days of Lord Mansfield. 14
But Lord Mansfield and his
successors had a different role. They brought many commercial
practices into the law and clarified these practices. These days,
the judiciary would have to resolve particular legal issues before
them while bearing in mind superior policies such as insolvency
priorities. The choice of the institution to undertake primary
responsibility for developing security law in the United Kingdom
would not be an easy one, but the choice affects the substantive
law that would be developed in the future,
and according to
149
Professor Komesar, the institution matters.
B. Market Self-Regulation?
Market forces could provide appropriate solutions if the forces
of competition work to allow an optimal solution. This is
assuming that there are no market failures or externalities involved
in the process. If the economic assumption of the rational man
holds true, then each lender must look out for himself and
maximize his own interest, and each lender, under the current
150
policy, would choose to take the best security as far as possible.
147 NEIL KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS 35 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2001).

148 Lord Mansfield was a prominent commercial judge in the nineteenth century. A
brief discussion of the development of English commercial law may be found in ROY M.
GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW 33-35 (1982).
149 KOMESAR, supra note 147, 198.
150 But see, Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV.

L. REv. 626 (1997) (arguing that some lenders choose to go unsecured for other reasons
and thus, it is not necessary to assume that lenders all want the best security). However,
for simplicity, the trend that lenders want best security, all other things being equal, is
assumed here to demonstrate the difficulty of relying on the market to provide the
solution to interpretation of security interests.
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This is already the default scenario in many of the cases where
lenders have structured ingenious fixed charges over book
debts. 15 1 The market tends to protect preferential creditors and
cannot be relied on to provide its own solution. Moreover, the
issue at hand is a legal issue in fabrication of security interests.
The provision of a legal framework
is necessary and should not be
52
delegated to the market.'
C. Academic Codification?
Academics may contribute to the legal fabrication of security
interests in the United Kingdom. By "academic codification"
there could be either an emphasis on "academic" or an emphasis
on "codification." If one emphasizes "codification," it could mean
that the process of legal scholarship is used to produce a code on
an area of law sought to be clarified and codified. Such a work of
codification could then become adopted by the legislature to
become law. Chalmers' codifications of the Sale of Goods Act of
1894 and the Marine Insurance Act of 1907 are examples of such
codification in the United Kingdom, as well as statutory reform
recommended by the Law Commission. 153 A prominent example
in the United States would be restatements of various areas of the
law and the production of the U.C.C. by the American Law
Institute. 154 Codification could include anything from all-inclusive
reviews and complete restatements, to smaller scale efforts in
151 See generally Re New Bullas Trading, (1994) 1 B.C.L.C. 485 (Eng.).
152 In a smaller community, the difference between a pragmatic solution that
markets provide, and a solution provided under law, may be of little practical difference.
However, law as an autopoeitic system has been argued by several prominent
commentators, and this paper affirms that the legal framework is a separate system,
though it has symbiotic ties with the economic relations and reality that it frames. See
Gunther Teubner et al., After Legal Instrumentalism: Strategic Models of PostRegulatory Law, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 299 (Gunther Teubner
ed., 1986); see also Julia Black, ConstitutionalisingSelf-Regulation, 59 MOD. L. REv. 24

(1996).
153 For example, the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts Act) 1943 and the Family
Law Reform Act 1987.
154 In the United States, the American Law Institute is the foremost example of such
codification efforts through academic discourse and work under the Institute. But the
historical reasons giving rise to the Institute are unique in the context of complex and
messy state laws and the preservation of legal elitism in the United States. See G.
Edward White, The American Law Institute and the
Jurisprudence,15 LAw & HIST. REv. 1 (1997).

Triumph of Modernist
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tidying up and putting together in a single text all the issues
relating to a small area such as unfair contract terms.155 If the
United Kingdom is hesitant in passing legislation for the legal
fabrication of security interests, then even if legal scholarship
produces a code, it would take many obstacles to be overcome
before the code becomes law.
Another possible interpretation of "academic codification" is
the emphasis on "academic," namely the work of systematically
organizing issues and concepts in an area of law in treatises.
Treatises have been indispensable as a means of structured study
in legal education, and the common law has probably survived
156
largely because of the complementary efforts of treatise writing.
However, these efforts need not produce a legal code on the issue
area concerned.
The concern with the codification of security laws into
statutory form is that such codification would have to grapple with
the question of whether or not to provide a notice filing system
administered by the state. The notice filing system entails great
cost because reconciling with the existing company charges
register would have to occur as well as the set up of a new
administrative office and infrastructure. Lawyers would have
to familiarize themselves with a new system of security
interest creation and work process. These reasons may account
for the United Kingdom's resistance as well as the legal
community's reluctance to champion codification of security
laws. 157 Furthermore, it may be uncertain whether codification
would provide the most desirable solution to resolving interpretive
issues in security law. Many would argue that the code is a
straitjacket and many revisions may be needed in the future for
155 Mark D. Rosen, "What has Happened to the Common Law?" Wis. L. REv. 1119

(1994) (demonstrating an elaborate taxonomy of codification).
156 See Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common Law

World, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 435 (2000) (arguing that the proliferation of treatises is one
way the common law avoided codification and yet retained a systematic order of legal
understanding).
157 Political championing and embracing by the community are essential factors to a
code's successful launch. See John W. Head, Codes, Cultures, Chaos, and ChampionsCommon Featuresof CodificationExperiences in China,Europe, and North America, 13
DUKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 1 (2003); James J. Brudney, Mediation and Some Lessons
from the Uniform State Law Experience, 13 OHIO ST. J. Disp. REsOL. 795 (1998)

(discussing the codification of mediation laws).
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adapting to changing times.158
Codification itself is also a process that may select and jettison
legal issues so that they become bureaucratized. The code could
become so deceptively self-contained that it could fail to admit
other related concerns or fail to connect with other integral areas
of law.159 It has also been argued that codification often results in
the selection of certain underlying assumptions of an issue area,
and that selection results in the marginalization of equally
contending assumptions
of the same area that could inform future
160
legal progress.
In the absence of comprehensive reform in the United
Kingdom, it should be acknowledged that legal progress could at
least be derived from a more systematic fabrication of security
interests. 16 1 The common law is capable of a systematic ordering
of legal issues and principles, if supported by both treatises and
issue-specific statutes. 162
If all things remain unchanged,
academics should take on the role of facilitating the legal
fabrication of security interests, by providing an unbundled
approach to discussing security interests. Academics are also at
liberty to suggest how the law may be reformed. Treatise
organization affects judicial perspectives, and if the judiciary is
open to the legal fabrication provided in leading treatises, the
common law could still provide a sound legal fabrication of
security interests. Some leading treatises in the United Kingdom
on secured credit are already structured in an unbundled way, but
they also reflect the reality of the formal and transaction-specific
approach taken in the courts.1 6 3 Perhaps a new approach could be
taken to rigorously unbundle concepts in security law so as to
158 Paul J. Omar, Codifying Commercial Law: A Project for the Millennium, 10

I.C.C.L.R. 81 (1999).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Omar, supra note 158.

162 Kevin M. Teeven, A History of the Legislative Reform of the Common Law of
Contract,26 U. TOL. L. REv. 35 (1994).
163 See generally Goode, supra note 36 (devoting chapters to definitions and means
of taking, fabricated in the language of "attachment and perfection," but specific chapters
are devoted to the compartments of fixed and floating charges, security over receivables
and so on); see also Wood, supra note 37 (organizing text more in terms of the specific
financing arrangement concerned than by unifying concepts).
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encourage the development of legal fabrication in more conceptual
terms. However, the question remains as to whether treatise
exposition, informed by precedent in the common law tradition, is
sufficient to develop a body of security law for current commercial
needs. A variety of efficient responses in law may be needed to
match rapidly changing commercial needs. But a cogent treatise
coupled with a revolutionary case, much like the leading case in
tort law, Donoghue v. Stevenson, 164 could provide the much
needed legal infrastructure for security law in a short number of
years, and that could be the same length of time needed for study,
consultation, and putting into motion the legislative process for a
codified solution.

164 Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.C.) (appeal taken from Scot.)
(U.K.). Donoghue is indisputably the leading case that started the growth of English tort
law. Before Donoghue, personal injuries outside a contractual relationship could hardly
be claimed in court. This case is regarded as the genesis of tort law in the United
Kingdom, and thus it is possible for private law to provide systems of law to resolve
social or commercial problems without legislation.

